Cristhian Molina

College admissions formulas determine which student characteristics are rewarded, but their interaction with pre-existing demographic advantages has received little attention. I study how Chile's 2013 ranking reform, which shifted admissions weight from absolute GPA toward within-school class rank, amplified the advantage that relatively older students hold over their younger classroom peers. Because older students earn higher grades due to a well-documented maturity advantage, they also rank higher within their school, and the reform increased the return to this relative position. Using a difference-in-discontinuities design, I find that the reform widened the application gap at the July 1 school entry cutoff by 3.8 percentage points (12 percent). The effect is concentrated among first-generation college aspirants from secondary-educated, higher-income families. However, marginal applicants are less likely to be admitted or to enroll, resulting in no net gain in college enrollment. The findings show that admissions formula design can amplify demographic advantages in college access even when the reform is motivated by equity objectives.

Employers cannot directly observe program quality, and institutional reputation provides reliable signals for only a small fraction of graduates. We study whether program-level accreditation in Chile resolves this uncertainty, using a staggered difference-in-differences design applied to administrative earnings records for 2,572 programs and exploiting first-time accreditation decisions between 2007 and 2018. Accreditation raises wages by approximately 3 percent on average, with the premium concentrated among cohorts graduating four to five years after the initial award. This timing reflects a compositional channel, as accreditation attracts higher-ability entrants while simultaneously expanding graduation to marginal completers whose weaker formal-sector attachment reduces the observed employment rate of the graduate pool. Consistent with a Bayesian employer-learning framework, the wage premium reaches 8.9 percent at lower-reputation institutions but turns negative at elite programs, where the certification label adds no new information to employers' already precise priors. Accreditation functions as a corrective signal that redistributes information rents toward graduates whose credentials would otherwise be discounted.

This paper examines program-level accreditation in higher education, analyzing student responses and institutional adjustments to this quality signal. Using administrative data from Chile (2007-2018) and a difference-in-differences approach exploiting staggered adoption, we estimate the effects of this information shock. First-time accreditation increases student demand (applications +10.2%, enrollment +7.3%), attracts stronger students, and reduces transfers, suggesting improved match quality. These effects are consistent across socioeconomic backgrounds. Investigating the signal's construction, we find no evidence of pre-accreditation increases in long-term structural inputs but document a significant rise in on-time graduation rates concentrated immediately before evaluation and not sustained post-accreditation. Effects are amplified by institutional reputation and weaker under mandatory regimes. Our findings reveal a policy trade-off: accreditation signals can enhance student sorting, even when institutional responses focus on evaluation metrics rather than long-term, structural improvements.